Menu

Was The Munich Agreement A Success

Munich was a disaster because it was exactly the opposite of what it wanted to accomplish. The agreement set a dangerous precedent by showing that Britain and France would accept the annexation of small European states in the interest of the continent`s stability. He encouraged Hitler in his desire to subjugate Europe and it can be shown that Stalin saw Munich as an encouraging sign that his own annexation of Czechoslovakia to the Soviet bloc would not provoke conflicts after the war. Instead of preventing aggressive expansionism as expected, the Munich agreement made it more likely in the long run. Later, at the meeting, a deception was agreed in advance to influence and pressure Chamberlain: one of Hitler`s accomplices entered the room to inform Hitler of other Germans killed in Czechoslovakia, and Hitler then shouted: « I will avenge each of them. The Czechs must be destroyed. [32] The meeting ended with Hitler`s refusal to make concessions to the demands of the Allies. [32] Later that evening, Hitler was concerned that he had gone too far to put pressure on Chamberlain, and he called Chamberlain`s hotel suite to say that he would only accept the annexation of Sudetenland without plans in other areas, provided that Czechoslovakia began evacuating ethnic Chechens from the majority regions of Germany by 8 p.m. on September 26. After being pushed by Chamberlain, Hitler agreed to issue the ultimatum for October 1 (the same date on which Operation Green was to begin). [37] Hitler then told Chamberlain that it was a concession he wanted to make to the Prime Minister as a « gift », out of respect for the fact that Chamberlain was prepared to back down a little from his previous position. [37] Hitler added that after the annexation of the Sudetenland, Germany would no longer have territorial rights over Czechoslovakia and would enter into a collective agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany and Czechoslovakia.

[37] After Poland learned that populated territories in Poland were to be transferred to Germany, Poland issued a note to the Czechoslovakian government regarding the immediate conclusion of an agreement providing for the unquestionable occupation of Polish territory by Polish troops; An agreement on referendums is expected to follow in districts with a large proportion of the Polish population. [75] Those who claim that appeasement is always bad were misundersting the lesson of the Munich Convention. But above all, the failure of Munich shows that politics must think long-term about the previous one. The agreement bought a year of peace from Europe, but allowed for aggressive territorial expansion in the years and decades that followed. The agreement was widely welcomed. French Prime Minister Daladier did not believe, as one scholar put it, that a European war was justified « to keep three million Germans under Czech sovereignty. » But the same is true for Alsace-Lorraine, unlike the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Gallup Polls, in Britain, France and the United States, said the majority of the population supported the agreement. In 1939, Czechoslovakian President Beneé was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

[52] The British and French relied on Hitler to maintain his word and their ability to react when he did not.